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Abstract
Background: Since late April, 2009, a novel influenza virus A (H1N1), generally referred to as the ‘‘swine flu,’’ has spread
around the globe and infected hundreds of thousands of people. During the first few days after the initial outbreak in
Mexico, extensive media coverage together with a high degree of uncertainty about the transmissibility and mortality rate
associated with the virus caused widespread concern in the population. The spread of an infectious disease can be strongly
influenced by behavioral changes (e.g., social distancing) during the early phase of an epidemic, but data on risk perception
and behavioral response to a novel virus is usually collected with a substantial delay or after an epidemic has run its course.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we report the results from an online survey that gathered data (n= 6,249) about risk
perception of the Influenza A(H1N1) outbreak during the first few days of widespread media coverage (April 28 - May 5,
2009). We find that after an initially high level of concern, levels of anxiety waned along with the perception of the virus as
an immediate threat. Overall, our data provide evidence that emotional status mediates behavioral response. Intriguingly,
principal component analysis revealed strong clustering of anxiety about swine flu, bird flu and terrorism. All three of these
threats receive a great deal of media attention and their fundamental uncertainty is likely to generate an inordinate amount
of fear vis-a-vis their actual threat.
Conclusions/Significance: Our results suggest that respondents’ behavior varies in predictable ways. Of particular interest,
we find that affective variables, such as self-reported anxiety over the epidemic, mediate the likelihood that respondents will
engage in protective behavior. Understanding how protective behavior such as social distancing varies and the specific
factors that mediate it may help with the design of epidemic control strategies.
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Introduction
An ongoing outbreak of novel influenza A(H1N1), colloquially
referred to as ‘‘swine flu,’’ has caused over 200,000 confirmed cases
(as of 28 August 2009 [1]). Because of under-reporting, the actual
number of people infected is substantially larger, particularly
considering that many countries have ceased testing for A(H1N1)
[1]. As human-to-human transmission became widespread in at
least one region of the world, WHO rapidly declared the outbreak
an imminent pandemic [2] and with widespread human infection,
WHO declared a phase 6 pandemic on 11 June 2009, where it
remains at the time of submission [3]. The virus appears to have a
higher reproduction number and somewhat higher case fatality
ratio than recent seasonal influenza viruses [4,5], and has certainly
caused great concern in the population, fueled by both extensive
media coverage and an initially high level of uncertainty about
mortality rates and transmissibility of the virus.
Mathematical and computational models are useful for
predicting the fate of an epidemic, and while such models have
become increasingly complex and realistic in recent times, a key
ingredient is often ignored: human behavioral responses to the
threat and/or presence of a disease [6]. How people assess risk of
infection and how such risk assessment drives behavioral change is
of great interest as individual social distancing can greatly affect
the spread of an epidemic [7,8,9]. While the effect of behavioral
change in response to perceived health threats on the spread of
infectious diseases has been investigated theoretically for some
time, particularly in the context of sexually transmitted diseases
[8], recent work has started addressing the problem in a broader
context that is also applicable to the spread of influenza [6,7]. This
work has a strong, though as yet under-explored relationship to
work on risk perception and health threats [10,11,12].
Data on risk perception and behavioral response in the general
population have rarely been collected right from the outset of an
epidemic. Instead, they are usually gathered with a substantial
delay in the case of influenza A(H1N1) [13], after the epidemic has
run its course, as in the case of SARS [9], or before sustained
human to human transmission is established, as in the case of
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highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) [14]. However, the
feasibility of halting or mitigating the spread of an infectious
disease is highest during the very early phases of an outbreak, and
thus data on behavioral response during this time would provide
valuable information for public health policy and research. Here,
we report the results from an online survey that gathered data
(n=6,249) about risk perception of the outbreak during the first
few days of widespread media coverage (April 29 – May 5, 2009)
of the emergence of novel swine-origin Influenza A(H1N1).
Methods
Ethics Statement
The research presented here was approved by the Stanford
University Non-Medical Human Subjects Institutional Review
Board on 28 April 2009 (Protocol #16782).
The Sample
We fielded in internet-based survey starting on 29 April 2009
using Opinio survey software [15]. The URL for the survey is
(https://opinio.stanford.edu/opinio/s?s = 1403). The sampling
universe for this study was adults 18 and older with access to a
networked computer. The initial seed for the sample was
generated using social networking software, and a request sent to
a standing subject pool comprised of Stanford alumni and social
science students at a nearby community college maintained by the
Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at Stanford
University. The survey was picked up by a variety of internet
media sources including several science general media blogs.
Directly following publicity in these blogs, we received the most
responses. Table 1 summarizes the sample.
Definition of Variables
The survey was designed to get a rapid assessment of
respondents’ affective state, sources of information on the
emerging pandemic, and the behaviors undertaken for protection
while minimizing respondent burden. As such, it included only 17
questions.
Questions probing subjective assessment of risk perception, level
of anxiety, and ability to avoid flu infection were asked on a 9
point ordinal scale with anchors at the extrema (‘‘very high’’, ‘‘very
low’’) and the center (‘‘intermediate’’). Subjective emotional status
(i.e., respondents’ affective state regarding the epidemic) was
anchored by the terms ‘‘very calm’’ through ‘‘intermediate’’ to
‘‘very anxious.’’ Comparative questions of subjective risk percep-
tion for eight health threats were asked using a five-point ordinal
scale with anchors at all points: ‘‘very low,’’ ‘‘low,’’ ‘‘intermedi-
ate,’’ ‘‘high,’’ and ‘‘very high.’’ Questions regarding media (both
respondents’ frequency of getting information from a particular
source and their judgment of each source’s accuracy) were asked
on a five point ordinal scale with anchors at all points (‘‘very often/
accurate’’ to ‘‘never/almost certainly inaccurate’’). Respondents’
knowledge of swine flu was assessed with a series of six True/False
questions. Respondents gave free-text responses to questions about
their current age, the number of people currently living in their
household (including themselves) and their zip code if they
currently live in the United States. Respondents who reported not
currently living in the United States were asked to report their
current country of residence in a free-text field. A screen-shot of
the full survey instrument is included in the Supplementary
Material.
For our analysis of participants’ response to the threat of swine
flu, we use a variable we call ‘‘survey day.’’ The survey went online
in the evening of 28 April, Pacific time, so we combined responses
from 28 and 29 April into a single day. This combined day of 28–
29 April represents survey day 1.
Subjects were asked to state the number of contacts in the past
24 hours. Contacts were defined by close physical contact as
operationalized by a face to face conversation of more than two
words in the presence of another individual or physical exposure
involving skin contact such as a handshake, hug, or contact during
sporting activities. Respondents were provided five ordered
categories: less than 5, 5–10, 11–20, 21–50, 51–100, more than
100. Handcock and Jones [16] discuss the phenomenon of heaping
and related problems for statistical inference in answering
epidemiological questions regarding contact number. Structuring
responses within broad ordinal categories avoids many of
the pitfalls of contact-heaping encountered in epidemiological
investigations.
Protection Index
To measure the response in epidemiologically relevant behavior
to information on the potential pandemic, we asked a series of
questions about protective actions taken by the respondents. In the
survey, we asked: ‘‘Given the current status of the epidemic, which
of the following precautionary actions will you take?’’
Avoid people who cough/sneeze
Avoid large gatherings of people
Wash hands more often
Avoid people who are in contact with infected people
Avoid public transportation
Avoid school/work
Avoid travel to infected areas
Use disinfectant
Wear a mask
Not all of these behaviors are necessarily effective or
recommended protective measures (e.g., wearing a mask), but
our aim was to gauge people’s attempt at self protection so even
non-efficacious behavioral change is interesting in that it indicates
willingness to act on the part of the respondent.
We constructed an index of protective behavior by summing the
answers to the questions regarding actions taken to avoid influenza
infection. The index ranged from 0–9, with larger values
indicating more protective measures taken. Using a binomial
GLM with canonical logit-link, we modeled the protection index
as a function of covariates. Our primary interest was the possible
mediating effect of affective variables on action taken to protect
against swine flu infection. To evaluate the hypothesis that
respondents’ affective state (subjective anxiety, fatalism about
Table 1. Summary statistics for survey sample.
Measure Value
Mean Age 37.6 (sd = 12.7, range: 18–93)
Fraction Female 0.466
Mean Household Size 2.43 (sd = 1.31)
Number with HS Degree or Less (Fraction) 250 (0.04)
Number with Some College (Fraction) 1131 (0.181)
Number with College Degree (Fraction) 2131 (0.341)
Number with More than College Degree
(Fraction)
2712 (0.434)
Number of US Respondents (Fraction) 4318 (0.691)
Total Respondents 6,249
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.t001
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infection) predicts protective measures, we include in the model
demographic (age, gender), epidemiological (household size,
number of contacts, survey day), and media (source of information
on the outbreak) conditioning variables. For the media variables,
we constructed dummies with a value of 1 corresponding to
answers of ‘‘very often’’ or ‘‘often’’ and a value of 0 for all other
responses to the question of ‘‘How often do you use the following
sources to get information about swine flu?’’ With such a large
number of conditioning variables, in addition to the affective
variables of greatest interest, there is a distinct danger of over-
fitting the GLM. To address this problem, we used likelihood-
based model selection [17] to search the model space set up by our
conditioning variables [18].
Of the nine protective behaviors, increased hand-washing is
both the simplest and probably most effective at curbing
transmission. As such, it is strongly advocated in infection control
educational material [19]. In addition to our tests for predictors of
the protection index, we therefore also tested the effect of
measured covariates on the odds of increased hand washing using
a binomial GLM again with canonical logit-link.
Perceived Risk Clustering
A concern regarding the relationship of people’s self-reported
anxiety and their protective behavior is that some people might
generally be more anxious regarding health. We probed general
anxiety by asking about respondents’ anxiety with regard to a
number of infectious, chronic, and violent threats to health. We
asked a series of questions probing respondents’ perceived
subjective risk on a 5-point scale for a variety of health threats,
including other infectious diseases (A(H5N1) ‘‘bird flu’’, seasonal
flu, HIV/AIDS), chronic diseases (heart disease, diabetes, cancer),
and violence (unintentional accidents, terrorism). We calculated
the correlation matrix for answers to these threat questions and
used Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to explore potential
structure in the responses to different categories of threat [20].
Results
We begin by presenting descriptive results of the survey and
follow with our primary analytical questions from the survey,
namely, testing the hypothesis that respondents’ affective state
mediates their protective action.
We gathered 6,249 responses from 28 April to 5 May 2009.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample.
Figure 1 presents the distributions of respondents’ contacts
within the 24 hours prior to taking the survey.
Figure 2 presents the means of the subjective threats. Swine flu
had a mean second only to injury, and the highest among the
infectious sources of threat. The mean of perceived threat from
swine flu fell above the Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence
interval for all other threats but unintentional injury.
Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution of perceived
personal risk. There is a notable bimodality to this plot. This
apparent bimodality is not simply attributable to sampling error
since the difference between the responses = 4 vs. those = 5 vs.
those = 6 is in excess of 300. Further analysis using finite mixture
Figure 1. Frequencies of the categories of respondents’ contacts outside the home.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g001
Figure 2. Means for the perceived threat levels for different sources of risk. Bars show Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals.
Codes: 1 = no risk, 5 = very high risk; ‘‘swine’’ = Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A(H1N1), ‘‘diabetes’’ = Diabetes mellitus, ‘‘HIV’’ = HIV/AIDS,
‘‘injury’’ = Unintentional injury, ‘‘terror’’ = Terrorism, ‘‘heart’’ = Heart Disease, ‘‘cancer’’ = Cancer, ‘‘H5N1’’ = Bird Flu, ‘‘H3N2’’ = Seasonal Flu.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g002
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models [21] provides strong statistical support for the reality of the
bimodal pattern (results not shown). While the majority of
respondents felt that their personal risk was low, there is a second
mode rating their risk as intermediate ( = 5). This same bimodal
pattern can be seen in the frequency distribution of personal
empowerment (i.e., ability to avoid infection) shown in figure 4.
While most respondents indicate that they are confident they can
avoid infection, a substantial second mode appears at the
intermediate value.
Figure 5 shows the frequency distribution of protective
behaviors. We can see that nearly 80% of respondents report
washing hands more frequently, while very few avoid work or
school or wear protective masks.
Figure 6 shows the means for respondents’ information sources.
Not surprisingly, the most common source of information reported
was the Internet. Again, mean values are plotted with their 95%
Bonferroni-corrected confidence intervals. With the exception of
social-networking tools (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), all other media
sources are statistically indistinguishable from each other, with the
social-networking tools being used significantly less.
The results of the model for the protection index show a
number of robust trends (table 2). In particular, we find that age
increases and male gender decreases the protection index.
Receiving a large amount of information from the internet,
television, and health officials all increase the protection index
while receiving large amounts of information from print media,
friends, or social networking media has no effect. The number of
household members has no discernible effect, though the number
of contacts outside the home does. For the ordered factor
‘‘contacts,’’ the first category (,5 contacts in the past 24 hours)
is the reference category. Interestingly, relative to respondents with
the fewest number of contacts, all other contact categories have
reduced protection indices, indicating that people with fewer
contacts take more protective actions. Not surprisingly, residence
in Mexico has a large positive effect, while residence in Canada or
Europe decreased the index. The day that the survey was taken (29
April = 1) had a negative effect on the index, indicating that
respondents took less protective action as the epidemic proceeded.
Respondents’ reported subjective anxiety has a substantial impact
on the index with high anxiety increasing protection, supporting
our hypothesis that affective state mediates protective behavior.
Increased hand-washing showed similar trends to the model for
the protection index (table 3). Male gender decreases while age
and survey day increase the odds of increasing hand-washing.
Receiving a large amount of information from the internet, radio,
television, and health officials increase, while living in Europe or
Australia/New Zealand decrease the odds. As with the overall
protection index, perception of risk and subjective anxiety
significantly increase the odds of increased hand-washing
modestly.
Figure 3. Frequency distribution of personal risk perceptions. While most respondents rate their personal risk as low, note the pronounced
second mode at the intermediate level of risk perception.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g003
Figure 4. Frequency distribution of personal empowerment. Again, while most respondents list a high level of personal empowerment, there
is a decided second mode at the intermediate level (1 = ‘‘very high: I feel confident I can avoid infection’’, 5 = ‘‘intermediate’’, 9 = ‘‘very low: I feel I will
not be able to avoid infection’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g004
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Changes in Behavior
A key epidemiological question is how people’s affective status
and protective behaviors undertaken change as the epidemic
proceeds. To develop a measure for this, we cross-tabulated
individual values of the protection index and affective status by
survey day. Pearson’s chi-square test for independence of both
tables was strongly significant (affective: x2 = 135.6, df=48,
p,0.001; protection: x2 = 113.1, df=54, p,0.001), indicating
substantial departure of cells from the expected values. To
visualize the pattern of departure from the expected values, we
calculated an expected tables taken as the cross-product of the
marginals of the observed table normalized by the grand sum. We
combined rows of these tables to simplify the presentation, plotting
the difference between observed and expected tables for a high,
medium and low emotional status/protection index respectively.
For example, a value of 251 on the calm affective status on day
one means that there were 51 fewer responses in the calm
categories than would be expected by the overall marginal
distribution of responses across all days.
In figures 7 and 8, we plot the change in respondent’s protective
behavior and emotional status over the first week of the survey.
The lines represent the differences between observed and expected
frequencies of responses for the 9-point scale simplified to three
levels each. We see that by day three of the survey (May 1st), the
relative number of people reporting a calm emotional state was
very high, while the number of people reporting high values of the
protective index declined dramatically. We interpret these results
to indicate that people’s response to a potential pandemic is quite
sensitive to media reports.
In general, individuals’ survey responses to perceived risk for the
eight health threats were only moderately correlated, with pairwise
correlations typically well under 0.5. PCA did not reveal that a
substantially reduced number of dimensions explained these
correlated data – six principal components were required to
explain 85% of the variance. Nonetheless, some intriguing PC
loadings revealed themselves. In particular, the second PC, which
explained 15.6% of the variance in the data, showed strong
positive correlations with swine flu (r = 0.516), bird flu (r = 0.530),
and terrorism (r = 0.467). All three of these threats receive a great
deal of media attention and their fundamental uncertainty are
likely to generate an inordinate amount of fear vis-a-vis their
actual threat [22].
Discussion
Our results indicate that respondents’ behavior varies system-
atically with covariates from demographic, epidemiological,
media, and affective domains. People’s anxiety about swine flu
and the preventative actions they took to avoid infection declined
as the perceived gravity of the novel outbreak waned. Overall,
Figure 5. Frequency distribution of the protection measures undertaken by respondents. (‘‘sneeze’’ = avoid people sneezing or coughing,
‘‘gathering’’ = avoid large gatherings, ‘‘wash’’ =wash hands more frequently, ‘‘shun’’ = avoid people perceived to be sick and potentially infectious,
‘‘public’’ = avoid public places, ‘‘school’’ = stay home from school or work, ‘‘Mexico’’ = avoid travel to affected foreign countries or states,
‘‘disinfectant’’ = use alcohol-based disinfectant, ‘‘mask’’ =wear a protective mask).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g005
Figure 6. Mean values of sources of information on swine flu cited by respondents. Bars show Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence
intervals. Codes: 1 = never use as source of information, 5 = very frequently use as a source of information.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g006
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subjective risk perception was low and people’s belief in their
ability to avoid infection was high. Both of these distributions
nonetheless showed a marked bimodality, with a large proportion
of respondents indicating a higher subjective risk and more
protective actions taken than the majority (Figures 3–4).
The results of our statistical modeling suggest that respondents’
deployment of protective behavior is mediated by their subjective
anxiety level, controlling for demographic, epidemiological, and
geographic variables. There is good and bad news in this result.
The literature on risk perception and public health shows that
there is generally a very weak correlation between people’s anxiety
over a particular risk and the probability of death or disability
arising from that risk [11,12]. Overall, it is unclear whether
anxiety over perceived risk will lead to efficacious protective
behaviors [10]. This said, by far the most common protective
behavior reported in our survey was increased hand-washing,
which has been shown to be effective at removing Influenza
A(H1N1) virus from subjects’ hands [23] and is promoted by CDC
and other health organizations as an effective infection control
intervention [19].
One curious result from the model for the protection index is
that people with the fewest contacts have marginally higher
protection indices. There are two potential explanations for this
finding: (1) individuals with small social support networks (and
consequently, few contacts outside the home) are more anxious,
making it more likely that they will take greater protective actions
or (2) people concerned about infection and taking relatively many
protective actions also reduce the number of contacts they have
and therefore had a small number of contacts in the past 24 hours.
The first explanation is consistent with work in social epidemiology
on the role of social networks in mediating infection risk [24,25]
Because of the nature of the sample, we are unable to evaluate the
direction of causality that leads to this result. Nonetheless, it
remains an intriguing hypothesis.
Many questions about this Novel Swine-Origin influenza
A(H1N1) virus remain. Of particular concern is the possibility
that the virus could mutate during the flu season in the southern
hemisphere and selection could drive it to become more virulent as
it returns to the northern hemisphere in Autumn. Worryingly,
such a pattern of multiple waves with an increased proportion of
the total influenza-associated mortality burden has been reported
for all three past influenza pandemics [26,27]. Finding a means to
simultaneously communicate to the public the structural uncer-
tainty inherent in projecting pandemics and the seriousness of a
pandemic after the media frenzy about its emergence has died
down remains a major challenge to public health.
Pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines and antiviral
drugs may form a strong line of defense, but the efficacy of such
measures remains unclear and depends on the particular biology
of a given pathogen. This is exacerbated by people’s reluctance to
be vaccinated [28]. With more than 300 infectious diseases
emerging within less than a century [29], the threat of pandemic
influenza is only the latest out of many public health threats posed
by infectious diseases in a globalized world. Unlike pharmaceutical
interventions, non-pharmaceutical interventions like social dis-
tancing may be effective in halting or at least mitigating an
epidemic independent of the specific biology of a pathogen, and
thus provide a reliable set of strategies to combat infectious
diseases that warrant further attention [30]. Our results that
people do not rely on social networking tools to the extent that
they rely on other media may have implications for CDC
strategies for spreading public health information via social media
[19]. In particular, public health messages spread via social media
will need to backed up by information spread via more traditional
channels, which respondents list as being common sources of
trusted information on the outbreak.
Table 2. Results of the binomial GLM for the protection
index.
Variable Estimate Std. Error z-score p-value
(Intercept) 21.2559 0.0517 224.32 ,0.001
Age 0.0060 0.0008 7.86 ,0.001
Male Gender 20.1499 0.0189 27.92 ,0.001
Household Size 0.0437 0.0192 2.28 0.0226
5–10 contacts 20.1454 0.0267 25.44 ,0.001
11–20 contacts 20.2506 0.0279 29.00 ,0.001
21–50 contacts 20.2502 0.0310 28.07 ,0.001
51–100 contacts 20.2393 0.0496 24.82 ,0.001
.100 contacts 20.3758 0.0673 25.58 ,0.001
Survey Day 20.0406 0.0074 25.48 ,0.001
Info: Internet 0.1899 0.0219 8.68 ,0.001
Info: Radio 0.0754 0.0243 3.11 0.0019
Info: TV 0.1496 0.0237 6.32 ,0.001
Info: Health Official 0.1520 0.0225 6.77 ,0.001
Info: Print 20.0506 0.0242 22.09 0.0363
Europe 20.2477 0.0309 28.01 ,0.001
Mexico 0.6507 0.1354 4.81 ,0.001
Canada 20.1176 0.0392 23.00 0.0027
Risk 0.0514 0.0065 7.93 ,0.001
Confidence 20.0439 0.0066 26.61 ,0.001
Anxiety 0.1856 0.0067 27.73 ,0.001
Variables of the form ‘‘Info: XYZ’’ refer to media source dummy variables that
are 1 if the respondent gets information from that source very often or often
and zero otherwise. See Methods section for definition of other variables. For
the ordered factor, contacts, 5 is the reference category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.t002
Table 3. Results of the binomial GLM for increased hand-
washing.
Variable Estimate Std. Error z value p-value
(Intercept) 20.4303 0.1518 22.84 0.0046
Age 0.0115 0.0027 4.25 ,0.001
Male Gender 20.5118 0.0662 27.73 ,0.001
Survey Day 0.0571 0.0254 2.24 0.0249
Info: Internet 0.4089 0.0696 5.87 ,0.001
Info: Radio 0.5064 0.0962 5.27 ,0.001
Info: TV 0.2502 0.0905 2.76 0.0057
Info: Health Official 0.4564 0.0897 5.09 ,0.001
Europe 21.1163 0.0895 212.47 ,0.001
Oz 20.7284 0.1810 24.02 ,0.001
Risk 0.1040 0.0223 4.66 ,0.001
Anxiety 0.3028 0.0280 10.83 ,0.001
Variable definitions as in table 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.t003
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Our study is subject to a number of weaknesses. The
advantage of our internet-based sampling strategy is the ability
to quickly deploy a survey and thereby track responses in near
real-time. The clear disadvantage of this strategy is a sacrifice of
population representativeness. Despite its general availability on
the internet, our sample shows a pronounced bias for highly-
educated respondents living in the Western United States.
These biases clearly limit the generality of our results, but the
large number of respondents filing out the survey as information
on the potential pandemic changed nonetheless provides a
uniquely valuable data source. Within one week (the cutoff point
for the current analysis), we had a sample of 6,249 responses. In
contrast, the telephone-based study of Rubin et al. [13]
employed a random-digit-dial sampling design, allowing a more
representative sample of the general UK population, but their
sample was only 997 respondents and the survey was
undertaken after media attention had abated, beginning 8
May 2009. Nonetheless, the results reported in this paper are
largely congruent with our own results and we see the studies as
strongly complementary.
Our respondents began filling out the survey on the day that
WHO upgraded the pandemic threat category of the H1N1
outbreak from 4 to 5 and spans the week in which the number of
WHO-confirmed cases increased tenfold. While our sampling
design is subject to many of the usual criticisms of internet-based
surveys and is not necessarily representative of the general
population, the unparalleled immediacy, longitudinal nature,
and the large number of respondents it contains make our data
set unique and scientifically important for the study of the spread
of information and distribution of risk perception and behavioral
change during the most uncertain time (i.e. the initial phase) of an
epidemic of a virus novel to the human population.
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Figure 7. Changes in difference between observed and expected values of the protection index over the seven days of the survey.
The pattern is significantly different from the expected pattern based on marginal frequencies (x2 = 113.1, df=54, p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g007
Figure 8. Changes in difference between observed and expected values of the emotional status over the seven days of the survey.
The pattern is significantly different from the expected pattern based on marginal frequencies (x2 = 135.6, df=48, p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008032.g008
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